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One of the nice things about the Cold War was that we could nearly
always tell who were our friends and who were our enemies. There
were certain countries we could more or less count on to take our side,
and others that regularly opposed us. It is, however, more complicated
now. If we could previously take the opposition of countries in the
Communist bloc for granted, we are now able to look to those same
countries for occasional support. With such nations potentially willing
to side with us on selected issues, we have fewer "reliable enemies."
The situation seems cause for celebration, and in many respects, it
probably is. There is, however, one consequence of this new potential
for alliance that poses an unexpected disadvantage. With the trans-
formation of reliable enemies into occasional allies, we are no longer
in the position of safely demanding their adherence to international
law. Instead, we are drawn into making concessions in order to keep
them on our side. In the international legal arena, reliable enemies
can be useful for the simple· reason that it is easier to take positions
of principle against enemies than against friends.
A striking example of this phenomenon was the need of the United
States government to gain the support of the United Nations for the
resolution authorizing use of force in the Persian Gulf. China, in a
position to use its veto power to thwart this objective, did not veto
the resolution, and many speculated that the United States had traded
an implicit agreement not to press China over its domestic human-
rights violations. The possibility of cooperation on one issue undercuts
willingness to take a principled stand on another. Had the United
States taken China's opposition on the Persian Gulf for granted, it
would have had no reason to "go easy" on China for its earlier violations
of human rights. Conversely, had China perceived the United States
as an implacable enemy quick to capitalize on China's human-rights
transgressions, the Chinese would have had no incentive to cooperate
over the Persian Gulf resolution.
No one can doubt that the ability to strike deals can be quite useful.
At the same time, however, fashioning deals involves a willingness to
make concessions, and states further their objectives only by helping
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other states to further their own. Although such pragmatic behavior
need not in itself cause problems, the concessions often involve ac-
quiescence to violations of international law. Are states entitled to
acquiesce in one another's violations of international law? Just how
and why this problem comes about raises important questions as to
how we should conceptualize the enforcement of international law.
1. BARGAIN MODELS AND PRINCIPLE MODELS OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ENFORCEMENT
To some, the question whether states have an obligation to protest
violations of international law by other states may seem like an odd
question. The more commonly asked question is whether states have
a right to involve themselves in legal enforcement at all. The injured
state itself has, ofcourse, a right to pursue all available legal remedies.
But the right of third-party states to become involved is less firmly
established. Indeed, many claim that such a right is truly exceptional. 1
Why then should we go one step further and intimate that not only
a right, but also a duty of intervention may exist?
It is undeniable that third-party states are more limited in their
powers to enforce international law than the victims themselves. Stand-
ing requirements, for instance, restrict certain remedies to the party
suffering the legal injury. 2 But it still makes sense to ask about third-
party obligations, for at l~t two reasons. First, some provisions of
international law provide rights erga omnes, that is, rights that run to
the international community at large. While it is unclear exactly what
enforcement rights of third parties are appropriate when an erga omnes
norm is violated,3 third-parry states seem to have some claim to
intervene and therefore the issue of a duty to intervene arises.
Second and perhaps more importantly, limits on third-party reme-
dies are not equally applicable to remedies of all varieties. When the
remedy indicated is international adjudication, doctrines such as stand-
ing are clearly pertinent. But such limitations are not as obviously
relevant when the remedy under consideration is an informal diplo-
matic or political remedy. Suppose, for instance, that the United States
were to violate the international legal limits on extraterritorial appli-
1. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Third State Remedies in International Law, 10 MICH. ]. INT'L,
LAw 57, 61, 96, 99 (1989).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 902,
comment a, n.1 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)}; Barcelona Traction, Light, &
Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.]. 3, 32 (Judgment of Feb. 5); South West Africa
(Ethiopia v. S. Aft., Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.e.]. 6, 32-35 (Judgment of]uly 18),
3. See, e.g., Prosper Weil, T(JUJards Relative Nornzativity in International Law?, 77 AM.]. INT'L
L. 413, 431-33 (1983); see generally THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAw 188-201 (1989).
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cation of its own laws. 4 Although the direct victim of the violation
may be a British citizen, France and Germany are not necessarily
prohibited from lodging protests. This result does not stem from the
violation being identified as erga omnes, but rather from the notion
that doctrinal limits are not clearly relevant to diplomatic or political
remedies. 5
It is ironic that international lawyers writing about international
remedies typically tend to focus on remedies of a more formal sort.
While such remedies may come to mind more readily to writers who
are, after all, trained in the law, this very focus undercuts the inter-
national system's claim to legality.6 Faced with the claim that the
international system is based on power politics rather than law, inter-
national lawyers are quick to point to the wide range of informal
remedies that supplement formal legal ones.7 Informal remedies pro-
vide necessary support for the claim that the international legal system
should be taken seriously.
Once we recognize the wide range of permissible third-party rem-
edies, it makes sense to ask whether they are obligatory under any
circumstances. There are two possible approaches to this issue. Under
the bargain model, states themselves are to decide which provisions
of international law are worth enforcing, and they may choose not to
intervene because intervention would not be to their advantage. Al-
though they possess the option to pursue remedies, they are not bound
to. Under the principle model, the parties may not make concessions
and trade-offs about whether international law should be observed.
Rather, international law is to be enforced "as written." In essence,
states have an obligation not to acquiesce to violations of international
law and are not free to take positions contrary to international legal
principles.
The principle model seems to be the more intuitively appealing
method of international legal enforcement. Bargaining over interna-
tionallegal sanctions seems objectionable because it involves sacrificing
the interests of third parties. Even if we are ready to allow two states
to bargain away their own international legal rights, that does not
mean that they should have the right to bargain away the international
rights of other states.
Given the fact that centralized enforcement mechanisms are lacking,
treating international enforcement as a matter of principle seems par-
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 402.
5. Lea Brilmayer, Reviews of Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
International Remedies, 14 YALE]. INT'L L. 579 (1989).
6. Id. ar 582-83.
7. See, e.g., loUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 2 (2d ed. 1979) (diplomacy is the
primary method for ensuring observance of inremationallaw).
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ticularly desirable. Absent a centralized enforcement mechanism, ag-
grieved states may have no recourse but to appeal to sympathetic
nations that are offended by the wrong suffered by the aggrieved
nation. Pressure from other states is one of the few viable methods of
legal enforcement. Such strategies only work while these other nations
continue to take a stand on principle, rather than acquiescing whenever
that is convenient. If other nations can bargain away their objections
to international violations, there will be few incentives to aid those
whose rights have been violated.
Despite the obvious appeal of the principle model, it does not seem
descriptively accurate. Nations commonly disregard injuries that other
nations have suffered on the grounds that pressuring the violators
would be inconvenient or would undercut other foreign policy objec-
tives. The desire of the United States to achieve unanimity on the
condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait may have resulted in ac-
quiescence to both Syria's involvement in the Lebanon war and support
for United Nations resolutions criticizing Israeli deportations of Pal-
estinians, as well as the aforementioned tolerance of Chinese human-
rights violations. Perhaps these were principled stands that would have
been taken apart from the Gulf crisis, although skepticism on this
point is certainly within the bounds of reason. It would be hard to
deny that nations sometimes make pragmatic considerations when
deciding whether to bring pressure to bear on international violators.
And such bargaining is much more likely to take place between
friends than between enemies. The United States is more likely to
look the other way when human-rights questions arise today in China
or the Soviet Union than when they arose in the past. There are greater
incentives still to disregard human-rights problems in EI Salvador. It
is easier for the United States to denounce a nation publicly for
violating international law when there is no expectation that the
United States may have to rely on that same nation a month later for
support. Reliable enemies are convenient because you can criticize
them without having to worry that they will not be there when you
need them. Reliable enemies won't be there regardless of what you
do.
Of course, bargaining is not absolutely impossible even with a
reliable enemy. There are, however, several reasons why it is more
difficult. For one thing, it is unseemly to bargain publicly with
consistent opponents. This is particularly true in a democracy, where
voters are likely to be appalled by negotiations with apparently im-
placable enemies. Recall the outrage'in the United States over the
secret arms sale to Iran. Bargaining with enemies is also difficult
because you are less able to rely on their carrying out promises. In an
ongoing cordial relationship, one can more easily count on performance
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as promised because the other party will not want to forgo the good
will it has built up in the past.
Admittedly, such things are always a matter of degree. There are
few enmities so solid as to preclude completely any possibility of
cooperation. During the Cold War, even the worst enemies must have
contemplated that they might need to work together at some point.
Similarly, the end of the Cold War did not make all alliances equally
likely; it is still possible to predict with some degree of precision
which nations you can afford to offend. Nonetheless, the general point
remains. The more likely that two nations will need each other in the
future, the less likely they will be willing to confront each other over
some issue deemed to be inessential. And each will be more likely to
overlook the other's international transgressions against a third.
II. THE CHOICE BETWEEN BARGAINING AND PRINCIPLE
Would it be desirable to reduce the ability of states to make
concessions regarding the legal violations of others? Should we tty to
find mechanisms to discourage such connivances? Do states have ob-
ligations to tty to remedy international violations?8 Which model is
better, the bargain model or the principle model? Ultimately, the
answers to these questions depend on fundamental issues regarding
what international law is all about. Exaggerating somewhat for pur-
poses of emphasizing the contrast, I will layout the opposing argu-
ments for the two frameworks.
The central argument for principle is this: states ought to be obliged
to bring pressure to bear on violators of international law because, in
the end, this is the most effective way to enforce international law. It
is cynical and contrary to the idea of law that states should trade
concessions over violations of international law. The aggrieved state
should be able to count on the assistance of other nations to vindicate
its rights. In a decentralized system of enforcement, no other mech-
anism is likely to be available.
The major argument for bargaining is that international law ulti-
mately rests on the consent of states. According to this view, state
sovereignty is the core value of the international system, and no state
may be bound against its will. In recent times, it has been argued
that some norms of international law are ius cogens and override even
8. The question here is not limited to legal obligations. Outside of a few limited areas (see
infra note 10), ir would be difficulr to argue that states currently have legal obligations to
intervene to correct international violations. Instead of focusing on legal obligations, I mean to
pose the question of whether States have moral obligations, and I would like to ask whether we
ought to move international law towards a greater recognition of these moral obligations.
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the express wishes of states.9 But even if one were to recognize the
special status of illS cogens, it would still be possible to argue that the
enforcement of the remaining norms of international law is entirely at
the discretion of other states. If international law were binding only
with the consent of states, then states should arguably be able to
choose not to enforce it against one another.
The argument between bargain and principle has close parallels to
the long-running dispute over why and whether international legal
norms are binding on states in the first place. Yet, despite the simi-
larity of these two disputes, they are not identical. In opposing bargain
to principle, we are asking not whether the state contemplating a
violation is bound, but whether other states are bound to condemn the
violation when they prefer not to do so. Within the scope of this short
essay, it is not possible to examine the larger jurisprudential issues
regarding the status of rules established by state consent. I will,
however, suggest a few ways in which the question of an obligation
to help enforce international law differs from the question of an
obligation to obey international law.
For one thing, there is generally a greater recognition of a duty to
obey than a duty to aid in the enforcement of international law. States
seem to recognize-at least in theory-that they have obligations to
obey international law, and they regularly make efforts to show how
their actions are consistent with international law. At least at the level
of platitude, most states assert their fidelity to international legal
norms. By contrast, there seems to be less consensus about a duty to
help in the enforcement of international law when other states violate
it. Rather, the general assumption seems to be that it is acceptable to
remain uninvolved and simply watch while others violate the law
undeterred.
Second, the duty to abide and the duty to aid in enforcement are
conceptually distinct. Even states that have consented to abide by
international law have not specifically consented to help enforce it.
Treaties typically spell out the obligation of the signatories to comply
with the treaty. But by signing a treaty, the parties rarely make an
additional explicit promise to pressure others to comply with its
terms. 10 An additional implicit promise would have to be inferred.
9. Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of lntemational HU1IUZn Rights, 80 AM. ]. INT'L L. I, 9
(986).
10. For example, rhe United Nations can call upon states to assist in carrying out sanctions,
as it did after the invasion of Kuwait. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Norwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.]. 16,55-58 (Advisory Opinion of]une 21) (sanctions adopted
by the Securiry Council against South Africa were binding on all nations and required their
affirmative support); Charney, supra note I, at 84 (discussion of the Drafr of the International
Law Commission on State Responsibiliry and the obligation to support enforcement actions
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Third, the distinction between the obligation to obey and the
obligation to aid in enforcement is reflected in domestic law. Citizens
are expected to obey the law but do not expect to have to take law
enforcement into their own hands. Of course, in the domestic context,
this may be due to the adequacy of domestic enforcement mechanisms.
And it is arguable that because no comparable mechanism exists
internationally, states may have a greater obligation to involve them-
selves in enforcement. But even if the analogy between domestic and
international noninvolvement is mistaken, it may nevertheless explain
why noninvolvement seems to be condoned. Indeed, the very fact that
the right of other states to become involved in enforcement is contro-
versial reflects an awareness that there are policies in international law,
as in domestic law, cautioning participants not to take the law into
their own hands.u
A final reason that enforcement differs from compliance is that the
enforcement obligation is more indefinite than the compliance obli-
gation. It is not entirely clear, for example, which nations are supposed
to intervene, and how far they are obligated to exert their pressure on
violators. Even if a general obligation of enforcement existed, this
would not help identify any particular state to commence enforcement.
And when a violation occurs, states may be tempted to wait to allow
other states to take the initiative in enforcing the law. If an individual
state waits, it can "free ride" by allowing other states to bear the COSts
of enforcement. Alternatively, a state may claim that the measures it
has taken already satisfy its obligation to assist. Unless the enforcement
obligation can be expressed more concretely, it will be difficult to
determine when a state has satisfied its international responsibilities.
All of these arguments support the bargain model over the principle
model. Another consideration, however, leans in the other direction.
The bargain model may be self-defeating because it undermines in-
ternationallaw in a way that makes further bargaining more difficult.
Essentially, underenfotced international norms lose credibility and
cannot provide the basis for bargaining in the future.
Under the bargain model, certain norms are more likely to be
underenforced than others. The norms most likely to suffer underen-
forcement ate primarily those of greater value to the violating state
against international crimes). Sometimes the international agreement itself spells out enforcement
obligations. See, e.g., Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Quelques remarques it
propos de I'obligation des {tats de "respecter et faire respecter" Ie droit international humanitaire "en toutes
cirromtan(es," STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw AND RED CROSS
PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET (Christophe Swinarski ed. 1984) (discussing sections
of Geneva Conventions obliging third panies to assist in their enforcement); MERON, supra note
3, at 29-31.
11. Charney, supra note 1, at 89; MERON, supra note 3, at 201, 214. _
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than to the enforcing states. Here, the "gains from trade" of forbear-
ance are substantial, for the violator has more to gain from the violation
than the other states stand to gain from preventing the violation.
Human-rights abuses pose an obvious example. The consequences of
human-rights violations are primarily domestic; as a result, enforcing
states have little directly at stake, while the violating state is deeply
involved. Whichever norms fall into this category, the end result of
the bargain model is likely to be a stripped-down version of interna-
tional law. Norms that are of greater interest to the violator than to
other states will fall by the wayside, leaving only the norms that mean
less to the violator than to the enforcing states.
The bargaining model will for this reason be at least partially self-
defeating. Once a pattern of nonenforcement of certain norms is
established, their value as bargaining chips is reduced. If the United
States, in an effort to induce support for its other foreign-policy
objectives, systematically looked the other way regarding violations of
human-rights norms, a pattern would quickly be established and the
United States would no longer have a concession to make in order to
induce the support it wanted. If the United States fails to pressure
China or El Salvador on their human-rights records, it will eventually
lose the ability to make credible threats of pressure on human-rights
issues. This is true for several reasons, including the evident hypocrisy
ofpicking and choosing the point at which to raise the issue of human
rights. The obvious interpretation of such behavior is a cynical one--
one that would likely not play well either at home or abroad. Further,
norms are devalued by going unused, and quickly fade from memory.
We expect principles to be applied consistently and not arbitrarily
whenever they are convenient or advantageous. When norms are in-
consistently followed, they simply lose their character as norms.
Is this, then, where losing our reliable enemies leads us? Academics
find it easy enough to speculate about the long-run trends that may,
in theory, come to pass. Experience has a way of thwarting these
predictions, and highly conceptual models do not necessarily have any
relevance to the concrete world. It does seem, though, that the choice
between principled enforcement and bargained concessions is a real
one. And it also seems clear that we are more likely to raise principled
objections of international law against our enemies than against our
allies. Although some other ideological rift may step in to impose
different entrenched alignments, for now at least, the demise of the
Cold War has contributed to a situation in which we have fewer
reliable enemies. The principle model of legal enforcement-to the
extent that it has current adherents-is one likely victim.
